A proof of principle nuclear forensics technique for determining ²³⁵U enrichment from UF₆ steel cylinders

Abstract

Non-proliferation of nuclear materials depends on international regulations and the inspection tools available to safeguard inspectors for ensuring adherence to international treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In collaboration with Dr. Michael P. Short (MIT) and the Mesoscale Nuclear Materials Group, this work investigated UF6 cylinders as a proof of principle to determine whether steel materials can be used as forensic materials for uranium enrichment. SEM, EDS, XPS, ToF-SIMS, TEM and FlashDSC were performed to determine if the surface deposition left chemical or damage signatures that could infer the presence of high enrichment 235U via the decay products present. Additionally, compositional and calorimetric analyses were performed to identify if radiation damage was detectable in the outer layer of the oxide, and was differentiable from chemical damage. The conclusion of this work indicates UF6 drums hold significant forensics information, and have promise for future research as an inspection tool.